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Abstract
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to describe the evolution of fraud schemes with historically conducted

with fiat money in physical space to the crypto-assets in digital space as follows: ransomware, price
manipulation, pump and dump schemes, misrepresentation, spoofing and Ponzi Schemes. To explain how fraud
schemes have evolved alongside digital asset markets, this study applies the space transition theory.
Design/methodology/approach - The methodology used is a review of the media regarding six digital
asset fraud schemes that have evolved from physical space to virtual space that are currently operational, as
well as a review of the literature regarding the space transition theory.

Findings - This paper finds that the digital space and digital assets may facilitate pseudonymous criminal

behavior in the present regulatory environment.
Research limitations/implications - The field is rapidly evolving, however this study finds that the

conversion from physical to virtual space obfuscates the criminal activity, facilitating anonymity of the
perpetrators, and creating new challenges for the legal and regulatory environment.
Practical implications - This paper finds that the digital space and digital assets may facilitate
pseudonymous criminal behavior in the present regulatory environment. An understanding of the six crypto
asset fraud schemes described in the paper is useful for anti-financial crime professionals and regulators
focusing on deterrence.
Social implications - The space transition theory offers an explanation for why digital space leads

criminals to be better positioned to conduct financial crime in virtual space relative to physical space. This
offers insights into behavior of digital asset fraudster behavior that could help limit the social damage caused
by crypto-asset fraud.
Originality/value - To the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to detail the evolution of fraud schemes

with fiat money in physical space to their corresponding schemes with digital assets in physical space. This
study is also the first to integrate the space transition theory into an analysis of digital asset fraud schemes.
Keywords Financial crime, Fraud, Cryptocurrency, Digital assets, Space transition theory

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Like crows captivated by shiny objects, it is difficult for many individuals to look away
when a new, innovative fraud scheme presents itself. With individuals quarantined at home
and bored, surfing the web for stimulation and uncertain economic conditions setting

financial criminals on the prowl, fraud schemes have proliferated during the COVID-19
pandemic. Partly due to an increase in online time and the meteoric rise in social media
attention, crypto-scams have taken flight. Brooks (2021) notes that between October 2020
and June 2021, Americans have lost $80m in cryptocurrency fraud schemes and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) reports that they received over 7,000 complaints from consumers
regarding crypto-investment scams.
A largely uninformed public and new technology, driven by social media influencers and
high media visibility, creates an amenable environment for the evolution of new fraud
schemes. In this paper, we integrate the fraud triangle theory with the space transition
theory to describe the evolution of traditional fraud schemes committed in physical space to
digital asset schemes that operate in digital space. We also address six currently operational
crypto-based or crypto-enabled fraud schemes that are based on historic fraud schemes:
ransomware, price manipulation, fraudulent disclosures, pump and dump schemes, Ponzi
schemes and spoof sites and fake apps. We conclude with implications for regulators and
anti-financial crime professionals.

2. Space transition theory the nature of digital assets
2.1 The nature ofcryptocurrency and the space transition theory
By some estimates, cryptocurrency could replace up to one-fourth of national currency
within a decade (Samejo etal., 2018), and at the same time, Kethineni and Cao (2020) state the
cryptomining attacks increased over one thousand percent in early 2018. Rob Wright, of
Europol, estimates that billions of dollars of criminal money is laundered annually with
cryptocurrency (Kethineni and Cao, 2020).
The problem is that the same features that make cryptocurrency appealing to the
public at large make it useful for crime (Potgieter and Howell, 2021). Cryptocurrency
provides a new opportunity to facilitate extant financial crime schemes, including Ponzi
schemes, randsomeware (Kethineni and Cao, 2020), price manipulation and “pump and
dump” projects (Cengiz, 2021). Low barriers to entry make it easy for criminals to
elevate existing fraud schemes with digital assets (Kethineni and Cao, 2020). Further,
digital coin transactions are instantaneous and irrevocable, and as the currency is
portable, criminals can take advantage of international transferability (Kethineni and
Cao, 2020).
While the borderless nature and nonreliance on central authorities facilitates commercial
freedom, international anonymity creates opportunity for fraudsters. The blockchain ledger
associated with cryptocurrency provides an audit trail, but digital coins are typically stored
under encryption with private keys (Houben and Snyers, 2018). Because the ownership is in
the form of a cryptographic key rather than personal identification, the participants are
anonymous. Another reason that cryptocurrency is more anonymous than cash is the lack of
an intermediary, such as a bank or financial institution, making it difficult, if not impossible,
to require disclosures (Potgieter and Howell, 2021). Kethineni and Cao (2020) point out that
cryptocurrencies enhance the opportunity for crime and extend crime in the virtual world to
the real world, a concept that aligns with space-transition theory of crime (Jaishankar, 2008).
Criminals are lured by the anonymity, security and the difficulty of tracing activity
(Kethineni and Cao, 2020).
Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle theory can be integrated with a relatively new paradigm
from the criminology discipline, the space transition theory (Jaishankar, 2008), to explain the
transferability of fraud schemes from the physical space to the virtual space in which digital
coins and their markets reside. The fraud triangle theory (Cressey, 1953) posits that three
factors are required for fraud to occur:

( 1)

a nonshareable pressure or motivation;

the ability to reconcile the cognitive dissonance arising from criminal activity with
one’s value system; and
( 3) the opportunity to commit the fraud.

( 2)

Integrating these two perspectives provides insights on the evolution of frauds in the
physical space have transitioned to the digital space. Jaishankar (2008) developed the space
transition theory to explain how the barriers to crimes once committed in physical space
have less deterrence value in cyberspace. By using cryptocurrency rather than a
government-sanctioned currency, criminals further shift crimes that are virtual or physical
by adding anonymity and means of escape.
The idea behind Jaishankar’s (2008) theory is that “people behave differently when they
move from one space to another.” Below, we summarize the main components of the space
transition theory and integrate them with the fraud triangle factors:
• Persons with repressed criminal behavior (in the physical space) have a propensity
to commit crime in cyberspace, which they would not otherwise t commit in
physical space. While the nonshareable pressures that drive fraud in physical space
still exist (desire to maintain status, position and reputational capital), individuals
have a stronger behavioral propensity to operationalize fraud in the crypto-realm,
including fraud with digital assets.
• Identity flexibility, dissociative anonymity and lack of deterrence in cyberspace
provide the opportunity to commit cyber-crime and the ability to rationalize
cybercrime, including digital asset fraud.
• The criminal behavior of offenders in cyberspace is likely to be imported to physical
space which, and criminal behaviors in physical space may be exported to
cyberspace as well; the fraud skills a fraudster has developed in the physical space
can be transferred to the digital asset realm easily with the added perceived benefit
of anonymity.
• The intermittent nature of offenders’ ventures into the realm of cyberspace and the
dynamic spatio-temporal nature of cyberspace offer the chance to quickly jump in
and out between physical and cyberspaces, enhancing the ability to evade detection,
which can make frauds with digital coins more lucrative than corresponding fraud
schemes in the physical realm.
• Strangers are more likely to unite together in cyberspace to commit crime in the
physical space. Associates of criminals in physical space are likely to unite to
commit crime in cyberspace. Consequently, the opportunity exists for the
establishment of networking to obtain the requisite technologies to facilitate digital
assets schemes and to increase the scale and scope of digital asset frauds relative to
fraud in the physical realm.
•

Persons from closed societies are more likely to commit crimes in cyberspace than
persons from open societies; this generates a greater opportunity through enhanced
access to an expanded market for fraud and through which to disseminate
information.

•

The conflict of norms and values of physical space with the norms and values of
cyberspace may lead to the ability to rationalize cyber-crimes (Jaishankar, 2008).
Digital asset fraud schemes may be more lucrative than physical space fraud

schemes simply because fraudsters are more able to distance their physical persona
from their crypto-persona.
The first two postulates of Jaishankar’s (2008) theory are associated with anonymity. Virtual
space provides anonymity to persons who might otherwise avoid crime due to personal
status or position. Anonymity provides a flexible identity. The use of cryptocurrency
improves the anonymity of the virtual space in which criminals operate.
Jaishankar’s (2008) third postulate states that offenses from the physical are transferred to
the cyberspace, and vice versa. Following that logic, cryptocurrency adds a new dimension to
either the physical or the virtual world of criminal activity. Crimes with physical currency,
whether associated with physical- or cyber-crime, can be transferred to cryptocurrency.
Jaishankar’s (2008) theory is designed to apply to the transition from one space to another, and
cryptocurrency moves the means of compensation to a virtually unregulated, non-physical
currency that can facilitate crime in either the physical or virtual space.
The fourth postulate states that cyberspace, compared to the physical space, improves
the fraudster’s odds of escape. Cryptocurrency increases the chance of evading authorities
by adding elements of complexity. Law enforcement must keep pace with a variety of forms
and processes for using cryptocurrency. There is a wide variety of digital currency, and the
industry continues to grow. Some currencies are more regulated than others and the
jurisdictions are disassociated, therefore complicating the determination of enforcement
authority. Furthermore, cryptocurrency makes it easier for offenders to share compensation
among persons in different countries.
Assarut et al. (2019) conduct a survey study and determine that cybercrime is facilitated
by freedom and anonymity. They explain that the constant, easy access to social media has
changed people’s attitudes. Freedom and anonymity are also facilitated with
cryptocurrencies. The use of cryptocurrency provides another layer of anonymity to a
criminal transaction, weak regulatory authority reduces the likelihood of being caught, and
the lack of country-level jurisdictional control of the currency provides freedom of access.
Felson and Clarke (1998) make the argument that the source of crime is rooted in
opportunity. Cryptocurrency creates opportunity if fraudsters perceive a lower risk of
identification or prosecution. Furthermore, the speed and easy access to cryptocurrency may
increase the anticipated certainty and the amount of payoff from the crime. Collection is not
subject to monetary institutions that operate during the business week and depending on
the country where the criminal resides, there may be advantages based on the wide range of
collection choices in multiple digital assets.

2.2 Challenges to regulation and enforcement
The space transition theory provides a framework through which the transition of
fraudulent activity from the physical markets to the digital asset markets is highly lucrative
in the criminal’s perspective. The relatively undeveloped regulatory environment
surrounding digital assets presents another opportunity factor for fraudsters relative to the
physical space.
Because of the active evolution of digital asset markets, to be effective, regulators require
an in-depth understanding of the rapidly developing underlying technologies. Thus, it is
understandable that law enforcement has “not kept pace with the sophistication of emerging
cybercrime (Kohnke et al., 2021).” According to Potgieter and Howell (2021), regulatory
agencies lack the inside knowledge of dynamic cryptocurrencies and are “ill-equipped to
govern these institutions.” Korver et al. (2019) advises prosecutors to be careful with online
research because they may reveal their identity. Yet, law enforcement is working to improve

technology and training. The blockchain that cryptocurrency relies on can reveal
transaction amounts, addresses, associated individuals. As criminals may use multiple web
addresses, law enforcement uses software that clusters the addresses associated with the
same owner (Korver et al., 2019).
The international and regulatory boundaries of cryptocurrency create a jurisdictional
challenge for authorities. For example, the IRS and the US Treasury Department in 2021 are
seeking approval from Congress to expand authority related to cryptocurrency because of
the international nature of the transactions (Sundaravelu, 2021). Former IRS director, Jorge
Castro, says they did not think they had the authority to expand the reporting (Sundaravelu,
2021). Cryptocurrency is attractive to those seeking a decentralized monetary exchange and
governance, but this means that authorities cannot aid victims of crime facilitated by
cryptocurrency (Cengiz, 2021).
We next describe the evolution of six time-tested fraudulent schemes into the digital age.

3. Old recipes [...] with an irresistible new sauce
Hope springs eternal in the minds of many investors. Financial market manipulations and
frauds are not new; sometimes it is outright theft, other times false expectations focusing on
a target’s greed and ignorance; for example, the internet bubble was driven by unrealistic
expectations regarding new technology and excessive optimism. Accordingly, many crypto
scams, once again, are old frauds dressed up with new technology. While the tactics remain
similar to past antics, digital coins provide a new payment conduit for lawbreakers who feel
protected by a perceived anonymity. Dupuis and Gleason (2020) argue that, although many
of the cryptographic transactions can be traced, some avenues still exist to launder illicit
funds; the main variable remains the criminal’s level of sophistication and the innate
reactive nature of regulation. Given the potential payoff of crypto-fraud, criminals are
learning quickly.

3.1 Ransomware
In recent years, there has been an explosion of media attention related to crypto ransoms, to
the extent that government representatives are debating the subject in the US Senate and the
daily news is replete with stories on the subject. Ransomware is a type of malware designed
to deny access, encrypt or publish data, either private or public. A demand for money
quickly follows the attack - pay up or lose access to your network/hard drive/system forever
as infected devices become inoperable. While this is a nuisance for private users (who wants
all their private pictures spread all over the internet?), the impact for home computers is
localized. On the other hand, corporate targets face major downtime and high operating
losses, so many of them choose to pay, but the price is rising. Hospitals, retail food
processors and distributors, utilities, any business is fair game including municipal and
governmental entities. This scam is not new, but it has recently been reinvigorated by the
introduction of digital coins. Prior to the cryptographic era, ransoms had to be paid in fiat or
through secretive tax haven accounts - dangerous, prone to failure and somewhat easier to
trace. Hacker groups now supply their services to organized syndicates with expert financial
management, customer service and IT support for victims (yes, they will help you set up a
Bitcoin wallet to pay the ransom!). Dobby (2021) explains that they plan their attacks for
months and can be extremely polite: “Good afternoon, we’ve stolen your corporate data.
Please kindly connect with one of our customer service agents to arrange payment.” These
fraudsters favor Bitcoin as compensation and, to a lesser extent, Monero. Bitcoin
transactions are traceable, but it is possible to muddle the tracks, while Monero trades still
remain concealed [1].

Recent examples in the US include Colonial Pipeline, a major oil provider that had to shut
down operations for a week in May 2021, driving fuel pump prices above $3 per gallon. The
initial hack apparently originated from the careless handling of a user id/password that
opened a backdoor to the system’s private network. The attack has been attributed to an
Eastern European group called “DarkSide,” and the ransom was set (and paid!) at 75 BTC,
roughly US$4m at the time (Morrison, 2021). Interestingly, the US Department of Justice was
able to recover 64 BTC, but declined to reveal the method used - most likely, the transaction
was traced by using software like Chainanalysis or Anchain.ai’s CISO (Compliance,
Investigation, Security, Operations), and “reverse hacking” was used to access the target
wallet as the illicit actors were probably negligent in the security of their financial
endeavors [2]. This is one of the very few cases with a relatively “happy ending,” and most
of the attacks favor the criminal element. The retail hacking of home computers warrants
much smaller amounts (typically a few thousand dollars) but what is lost in size is gained in
volume and lack of defense. Most individuals do not have the expertise necessary to protect/
retrieve their data and reaching out to a web-based “angel” can compound the problem as
fake recovery services abound; once they gain access to the victim’s computer, the game
starts anew. Social networks are not immune to hacking; the Instagram accounts of small
business owners and private users were attacked in May 2021 by “foreign actors” reputed to
be based in Turkey - the investigation continues. It is estimated that home and corporate
ransoms totaled over US$$18bn in 2020.

3.2 Price manipulation
Business entities have been attempting to manipulate stock prices since the existence of
markets, including accounting schemes such as “big bath” earnings management, leaked
rumors; examples are not difficult to find. Fortunately, in the USA, the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) and other regulatory bodies are watching, but they have focused
primarily on stock and derivatives markets; crypto exchanges are just beginning to feel the
heat. For example, in 2018, Elon Musk (Tesla Chairman) tweeted that he could take Tesla
private at $420 per share, triggering an immediate reaction in stock value. The SEC argued
that there was no factual basis for this statement and acted, and Musk had to step down as
Chairman, agree to have all communications reviewed by a legal team prior to disclosure,
and both (Tesla and Musk) were fined US$20m each. In June 2021, the SEC took further
action, claiming that Musk failed to comply with the 2018 settlement - as we are writing this
paper, the case continues. This example serves as a backdrop to the present scene featuring
digital coins; anything goes [...]. The same Elon Musk has repeatedly moved crypto
markets with a single tweet while accumulating cryptocurrency positions, with no
repercussions or reprimand by any regulatory body. Of course, there is a major difference
between Tesla and Bitcoin/Dogecoin; Musk is not the Chairman for those digital coins. He
has no responsibility to implement corporate strategy and therefore no authority or insider
control - he is simply an influencer like many others, devoid of responsibility - with a
strong following. Ante (2021) shows that Bitcoin and Dogecoin experienced abnormal
returns of 18.99% and 17.31% following Musk’s comments on Twitter - an action that
would result in swift admonishment if it was stock-related. As various governing bodies are
still struggling with the mere definition of a crypto-asset, the regulatory response is
presently muted and the party continues. In Musk’s own words: “I pump, but I don’t dump!”
Social media networks are rife with examples of coin marketing, rumors, false reports and
blatant advertising disguised as newscasts. It is the Wild West out there, investor beware.
Price manipulations in the digital age are not limited to social media. In a move
reminiscent of the “.com bubble” of 2000, the company “Long Island Ice Tea” changed its

name to “Long Blockchain” in 2017 while maintaining its main product line (beverages) and
claiming that it would diversify into [...] blockchain technology. The stock price
immediately tripled. In 2019, the FBI opened an investigation into potential insider trading
allegations in relation to the name change and the SEC delisted the stock in 2021. Once
again, if the problem was related to stock markets, supervisory protocols would act
efficiently - but the same cannot be said of the crypto world. This lack of control over virtual
coin operations opens the door to our next topic: the “Pump and Dump.”

3.3 Pump and dump
Kamps and Kleinberg (2018) trace pump schemes back to the South Sea Bubble from the
early 1800s. They design a detection technique that relies on price anomaly over a defined
window of time and merge the results with data on coins displaying a low market
capitalization. The outcome is an identification system that positively flags potential
ongoing schemes. Crypto “Pump and Dumps” lead to short-term bubbles, often drastically
increasing prices within minutes, followed by a quick reversal (Li et al., 2021). The
digitization of assets has noticeably facilitated the task for schemers; increased speed, easy
dissemination of fake news and a large audience are now the norm. Pumping asset prices
through marketing and media presence dates back many centuries but a diligent
stakeholder could always investigate the fundamental value of the asset. In that aspect, the
pump and dump of virtual assets is somewhat more complicated to detect as the fair value of
cryptocurrencies is difficult (or impossible, in the opinion of many) to assess and everyone
believes they hit the jackpot when the coin price moves up. If this is a natural phenomenon
due to a free-floating increase in demand (warranted or not) and a limited supply, it does not
reside in the realm of frauds. Illicit actors are very astute at targeting the greed and
gullibility of novice investors and empty promises of astounding returns are just that promises. While we cannot expect all buyers to understand the efficient markets hypothesis
(EMH), constant monthly returns of 10-15% without the associated risk are, simply put,
impossible.
The digital “pump and dump” is a modernized version of the old “boiler room” fraud;
first, buy the supply (as much as possible) of an illiquid, defunct (but listed) or stale asset.
Second, pump the price through false news, media exposure, personality endorsement and
pressurized sales tactics. In the old days, pumping required cold-calling target lists. It is
much easier now with the extended reach of social networks - a few posts on chat rooms, a
podcast from a known influencer and the marketing machine is activated; greed can do the
rest. A common tactic is to highjack the comments section of crypto-related videos or
discussions with feigned but convincing enthusiasm about a token or project:
Good work, thank you, I love your broadcast. Can you please help me to decide about the $IDEA
coin? They plan to make a public sale on (exchange name) after their amazingly successful private
placement that was oversubscribed by $10M. Should I invest?

If the asset is a stock, a thorough fundamental analysis will quickly uncover the scam, but
digital coins are peculiar as the intrinsic value tends to be subjective. Once the price of the
coin increases, a psychological phenomenon is known as FOMO (fear of missing out) sets in
and the path becomes parabolic - time for the “dump” part. The scam originators unload
their position on unsuspecting victims at a substantial profit and the deed is done, leaving
the more gullible targets holding a valueless asset. After the media onslaught ends, the price
drops rapidly to a more sustainable (in-line with EMH expectations!) level, and late buyers
can now experience regret.

The rapid growth of virtual assets has created a void that regulating bodies are slow to
fill. For law enforcement to get involved, we need well-defined rules! In the absence of a legal
framework, fraudsters are getting bolder: case-in-point, groups (yes, there are more than
one) calling themselves “Crypto Calls.” The premise is simple - they openly offer 6-h weekly
pumps using various little-known coins [3]. They target followers on their Telegram channel
and issue instructions as follows: first, wait for their signal. When it is sent, buy as many of
the coin as possible, immediately. After five hours, when everyone “in the group” has made
their purchase, the instigators will leverage the pump on social media thus inducing FOMO
in the population at large. When the price is high, unload your coins and get rich at the
expense of unsuspecting plebes! Simple, no? The following is a direct transcript of their
promotional video:
Welcome to Crypto Calls - a leading cryptocurrency pump group, where we skyrocket the value
of coins for six hours at a time. To start, create an account on the CryptoPIA exchange and fund it
with Bitcoin. For information on our weekly pumps including the name of the coin we are
pumping, follow our Telegram channel. Once released, be sure to buy the coin as quickly as
possible. When everyone in the group has purchased the coin, we will begin advertising it to other
investors on social media: Twitter, Instagram, Youtube, Stocktwits and Telegram. Everyone is
involved in marketing so we can achieve maximum profit. Throughout the six hours, you will see
two or three major pumps powered by targeted marketing [...]. When it’s time to sell our whole
position about five hours into the pump, place your sell orders above market price. During the last
hour, outside investors will fill the orders as they FOMO into the coin that we have increased in
value by 1000 - 2000%. By the time the six hours is up, everyone in our group will have sold for
profit [...].

Of course, the organizers are taking advantage of their followers. The promoters had
already purchased the digital asset before releasing the call. Even if the advertising does not
trigger a social media frenzy, the organizers profit when the members of the group start
buying - and the last ones to the party are left holding the empty bag. Surprisingly, this
scam is promoted openly, with impunity, over multiple channels. Other recent examples also
include the “Dubai pump,” where a false press release claimed that the Dubai authorities
were officially endorsing the low-volume DubaiCoin, propelling the token from US$0.10 to
US$1.50 (1,400%) in one week - all from a single “fake news” item. The government was
quick to deny the allegations, and the price subsequently crashed 80% from its apex.
With the resurgence of digital pumps, the literature now focuses on detection. Nghiem
et al. (2021) argue that they can predict the identity of a “pump and dump” target and
estimate the highest trade price with a 6.1% margin of error. They use a neural network
based algorithm on market and social media signals to single out the coin under pressure
and construct a model to evaluate the price peak. Nizzoli et al. (2020) investigate social media
networks and find that 56% of Telegram messages originate from bots or suspended
accounts and, vice-versa, 93% of Twitter bots messages revert to Telegram, promoting both
“pump and dump” and Ponzi schemes. Hamrick et al. (2018) perform an analysis on a similar
dataset (Telegram and Discord) and identify over 5,000 distinct pumps, enough to wonder if
there are any real messages left on the platforms. If this research can be adapted into a
commercially viable tool, there is hope of foiling pumping attempts. For now, detection
software resides outside the reach of most traders, and investor education remains the main
defense against most “pump and dump” schemes.
3.4 Misrepresentations and fraudulent disclosures
“Misrepresentation” refers to the falsification of declarations in financial statements, legal
documents and promotional material. The fraud part becomes a question of intent (known

misrepresentation, a defining feature of fraud) - is management purposely altering the
numbers/promises to obtain financial gain or simply neglecting to tell the whole story?
Generally accepted accounting practices are well-defined and documented - multiple cases
have been tried in court and resolved. Wells (2001) characterizes purposeful fraudulent
omissions (from an accounting perspective) into five categories, namely, liability omissions,
significant events, management fraud (even immaterial amounts), accounting changes and
related party transactions. Gallo (2021) shows that the practice of false advertising reaches
even peer-to-peer lending marketplaces; in 2021, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged LendingClub with wire fraud, false statements
and covered conduct with the aim of increasing market share by facilitating the acceptance
of sub-par borrowers. Remember the good old days of 2008 when manipulations were the
exclusive domain of big banks?
While regulatory bodies are well-equipped to handle misrepresentations related to
traditional assets, the digital wave has created a completely new landscape for wrongful
disclosures; ICOs (initial coin offerings), cryptocurrencies, cloud mining and NFTs (nonfungible tokens) are the new playground for illicit actors committing “oversights”
(deliberate or not) and, in some cases, clear scams. Dupuis et al. (2021) argue that the present
accounting/auditing standards need to adapt to the virtual era; they further highlight
potential fraud risk factors tied to virtual assets and propose improvements for the
education of future auditors. Many misrepresentations do not involve accounting principles
but simply public statements that deviate from the truth, particularly when firms try to lure
investors. Of course, most schemes described in this study include falsification in one form
or another, but in some instances, the intent is real as opposed to a complete fraud; the devil
is in the details [...] and their disclosure or promotion.
Even as the US legal and regulatory framework is developing, numerous governing
bodies like the SEC, the DOJ, Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the Treasury
Department, etc. are jousting for a piece of the pie and pursuing fraud cases - but the
jurisdiction of each still remains unclear. In May 2021, the US Supreme Court ruled that
the FTC did not have the authority to “obtain restitution” in the case of one of the
cryptocurrency scam reports it received - and there were 7,000 other cases in the year
2020 [4]. Under existing laws, the demarcation between state and federal mandates is still
ambivalent. The legal ramifications are beyond the scope of this study but, for illustration
purposes, we highlight a few recent cases ranging from mild but worrisome (i.e. Tether) to
failed attempts (DeFi Money Market) and outright cons (Bitcoiin2Gen, DeFil100, etc.).
Tether is advertised as a “stablecoin.” By definition, each Tether coin is supposed to be
backed by a US dollar in reserve. Tether Ltd. Is controlled by iFinex, the owner of Bitfinex, a
crypto exchange. First issued in 2014, the coin was traded on Bitfinex as early as 2015 and
mainstream adoption quickly ensued for valid reasons; the off-ramp between digital coins
and fiat currency is cumbersome, costly and slow. If Tether really represents a US dollar,
transactions in the crypto-space are greatly simplified. There has been rampant speculation
that this stablecoin was used to manipulate Bitcoin prices (print “unbacked” Tether to buy
BTC) as posited by Griffin and Shams (2020); their findings show that “purchases with
Tether [...] result with sizable increases in Bitcoin prices [...] consistent with the supply
based hypothesis of unbacked digital money inflating cryptocurrency prices” thus
contradicting Wang (2018), who disagrees and argues that “Tether grants did not Granger
cause Bitcoin returns.”
The coin issuer, iFinex, is in full control of the supply and the only representation the
firm makes is that Tether is pegged to, and fully backed by, USD on a ratio of 1 for 1. In a
twist of events, iFinex’s relationship with its auditor, Friedman LLP, was dissolved in

January 2018. The auditor’s report for 2017 showed full compliance, but the same cannot be
said of 2018 as the findings were never released. In 2019, the New York office of the
Attorney General (OAG) filed a legal petition against Tether’s issuers, not because of
misrepresentation, but due to shady dealings concerning the cover-up of a US$850m loss
(Keroles, 2021). The OAG concluded that, as of November 2018, Tether was not backed by
fiat USD. The case was settled in 2021; Bitfinex and Tether, with no admission of guilt,
agreed to pay US$18.5m in penalties and to discontinue any business activities with New
York entities. Since then, Tether has updated its webpage as it now reads:
Every Tether token is always 100% backed by our reserves, which include traditional currency
and cash equivalents and, from time to time, may include other assets and receivables from loans
made by Tether to third parties, which may include affiliated entities [...] [5].

The wording is now clearly different from the original. As the reserves include loans to affiliates,
the notion of counterparty risk surfaces. In the event of a 2008-style meltdown, the domino effect
from a potential default on loans could topple Tether with grave consequences for the crypto
space. Recent reports have surfaced comparing a put option on the stablecoin to a credit-default
swap; the bears are still on the hunt [6]. Strangely, the market seems to be oblivious to the danger
as Tether presently has over US$62bn (August 2021) in circulation although competitors with a
more stable profile like the Gemini Dollar and the USD Coin are gaining traction.
Coin projects sometimes straddle the line between failure and scam. Although the SEC
makes liberal use of the “unregistered digital asset securities offering” all-encompassing
accusation, the real fraud lies in the false claims made by the promoters. This is the case for a
DeFi (decentralized finance) project called “DeFi Money Market” where Tokens were sold using
smart contracts and promised a return of 6.25% based on collateralized car loans (Broderick,
2021). The volatility of digital assets caused the project’s demise, but the promoters failed to
inform the investors - hence the US$30m fraudulent misrepresentation. The perpetrators
(corporation and individuals) were fined a total over US$13m for their actions.
Bitcoiin2Gen (B2G, notice the homoglyph? See Section 3.5) should belong to the category
of fake ICOs because the coin never really existed, but prosecution was completed under the
guise of multiple false statements - regardless of intent. B2G was promoted as a mineable
coin, tradeable on the Ethereum blockchain through Start Options - the “largest Bitcoin
exchange in euro volume and liquidity” and “consistently rated the best and most secure
Bitcoin exchange by independent news media” (SEC, 2021); both statements are patently
false. The case is still underway as of August 2021. If the demarcation between outright
fraud and failure with good intentions is sometimes unclear, DeFi100 may fall on the wrong
side of the line. On May 22,2021, the project’s website posted the following message:
We scammed you guys and you can’t do s*** about it. HA. All you moon bois have been
scammed and you can’t do s*** about it. (Broderick, 2021).

A little obvious, but we should thank the anonymous post for the clarification - the SEC’s
work would likely be facilitated by the comment. The owners of the project were quick to
deny wrongdoing: “We never stole any funds,” but decentralization implies little chance of
the investors getting their money back. The promoters subsequently blamed the nefarious
post on hackers and fake news, but the damage is done; the coin price is in freefall, from a
height of US$3.30 to the present US$0.17. Incidentally, the project is still alive at the time of
writing and no regulatory action has been reported.
To alleviate the likelihood of fraudulent misrepresentation, Krapels and Liebau (2021)
proposes the “minimum disclosure requirements for cryptocurrency and utility token
issuers,” arguing that best practices should facilitate an efficient price discovery process.

They state that basic financial details must include, “token issuer information, initial and
current cash positions, as well as token treasury information” while required non-financial
data comprises contact info, open-source software and progress updates.

3.5 Spoofsites andfake apps
This type of scheme relies on the blind trust that users display when dealing in the virtual
space. The scam perpetrators design an application (Android, Google, iOS, etc.) or a
webpage that precisely replicates the legitimate site and then create a fraudulent link by
changing one or two characters in the original web address. They distribute this false
gateway through trojanized malware, grayware, social media marketing, and search
engines, often temporarily displacing the real link in the search hierarchy. In 2019, the
official “Google Play Store App” was found to include 27 malicious apps that replaced the
complete official Play Store with a fake one, inundating the unsuspecting users with full
screen advertising every time an app is loaded. While this was a merchandising scam, the
same principle applies to crypto-related sites with a more nefarious intent to steal your
virtual wallet identification and passwords, thus gaining access to your coins. For example,
if you use a hot (online) wallet and buy a new phone, you will automatically go to the app
store and download the latest version of the wallet. Unbeknownst to you, the loaded app is
fraudulent but looks exactly the same as the original. You then enter your user identification
and password, thus giving away complete control of your virtual assets to the illicit agent
running the scheme. Beware of external .apk (Android) or .ipa (iOS) applications that are not
screened by third parties. Fake apps have been created to replicate Binance, Gemini, Kraken,
TDBank, Bittrex, etc. As with ransomware attacks, the scammers are becoming more
sophisticated, with real customer support who will be glad to help you transfer funds into
the account for an eventual crypto purchase - only the money will never get there. In
January 2021, over twelve fake wallet apps were listed in the Google Play Store: the popular
wallet Exodus was listed under three different possible choices - two were spoofs. Figure 1
shows two possible downloads; the real one on the left and a scam on the right. The
provenance of the app (Exodus Movement Inc. versus Exotax) might raise a warning flag
for knowledgeable users but most beginners will not take notice.
The same modus operandi applies to websites, but they may be easier to spot: the link
address will differ slightly from the original; this is also known as a “homoglyph attack” or
“typosquatting.” A simple Google search will highlight dozens of webpages with exhaustive
lists of fake sites [7]. Sometimes, the difference can simply consist in a one-letter swap in the
address (the number “1” instead of the letter “1” - yes, they look exactly the same) or a
change in font from the original logo. For example, “deriibit.com” is a fraud domain

Figure 1.

Apps for the exodus
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targeting the legitimate “deribit.com,” “binonce.com” for “binance.com,” etc. Figure 2 shows
two different websites pretending to be Binance.com - can you tell the real from the scam?
Xia et al. (2020) identify 300 fake exchange apps and 1,595 scam domains. They contend
that 60% are not identified as such, while 40.5% show up on at least one anti-virus
engine [8]. In total, 323 fake applications targeted 38 exchanges, covering most, if not all of
the major crypto platforms. The study shows that a large proportion of the fraudulent
representations are controlled by a relatively small number of attackers and further
discloses the Bitcoin blockchain addresses associated with the schemers, as well as their
names, when available. The Poloniex exchange is the most “spoofed” with 35 fake apps and
45 fraudulent domains, while BitMax sits at the bottom of the list with only four scam
applications. Though it is possible to track many of the impostor domains and apps, most
novices will not be aware of the danger and investor education is the mainline of defense.
Unfortunately, in line with the regulatory dialectic theory, new schemes are most likely
under development as we write these lines.

3.6 Ponzi (pyramid) schemes
The origin of the term “Ponzi Scheme” dates back to 1919 and refers to Charles Ponzi, an
Italian-American who swindled thousands of people out of approximately US$10m by
promising a 50% return in 45 days. Although he caught the media’s attention, he was not
the first; Susan E. Howe (1879) and Warren Miller (1899), etc. preceded him, but the name
stuck. Fast-forward to modern times, everyone has heard of Madoff; a US$64bn fraud with
over 4,800 clients. The procedure is still the same: make a lofty promise about investment
returns, use new clients’ funds to pay profits to existing investors and skim off the top while
the party lasts. By their nature, pyramid schemes cannot last; inflows must continuously
accelerate to cover outflows, even when the reported amounts are fictitious, as some clients
will sometimes insist on cashing out before the collapse. Why do people fall for these
schemes? The answer generally lies in behavioral biases, but can simply be reduced to one
word: greed - followed closely by pride and ignorance. The greed triggers the initial
investment, ignorance fuels it, and pride prevents a timely exit or the dissemination of
information. Even a superficial knowledge of the efficient market hypothesis (i.e. return is
related to risk) could warn potential victims, but the swindle is still alive and well.
The digital age provides a new playground for fraudsters; the art of reheating an old
scam with a new sauce. McGee and Conlon (2021) describe one of the most famous recent
cases, OneCoin. A combination of Ponzi scheme, pump and dump and fake initial coin
offering, OneCoin promoters claimed that it was a mined, decentralized and capped
cryptocurrency, and it was touted as a “Bitcoin killer.” Anyone searching a little further
could have uncovered the fact that there was no blockchain and no active market for the coin
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except the proprietary exchange Xcoinx - and you had to be a member (own the coin) to
access it. It was promoted through webinars, roadshows and courses on cryptocurrencies as part of a multi-level marketing strategy - and referrals were well-rewarded. The delivery
method alone was enough to raise red flags, but in 2016 digital coins were the domain of
dreams and fintech enthusiasts, mostly baffling to non-specialists. The main advocate of the
scam disappeared in 2017 with US$4bn in investor money. Also straddling the fine line
between fake ICO and pyramid scheme, BitConnect, released in 2016, was touted as a
lending platform. Just convert your Bitcoins into BCC (BitConnect coins) on their proprietary
platform and let the trading bot (another nice word for a black box) make miracles for you!
Users were “promised” returns of 1% daily and the coin rose in value from US$0.17 to US
$463.00 at its peak. The scheme was marketed through flamboyant influencers (i.e. Carlos
Matos), multi-level marketing and word-of-mouth fueled by FOMO. In October 2017,
regulators from Texas and North Carolina issued a cease and desist order that led to the
closure of the lending platform and exchange. Other similar examples include PayCoin,
PlusToken, GainBitcoin, etc. Despite the regulatory crackdown on some of the crypto
related pyramid schemes, the practice remains common as this article is written, even if
warnings are readily available with a simple search. For example, webpages like https://
www.cryptobase.best/ and https://www.cryptobase.team/ are both attacks on an Italian
company called Cryptobase Ltd. These fraudulent websites apparently belong to the Milton
Group and have no relationship with the Italian software firm - both scam sites are active,
promising daily cloud mining returns of 16%. The scam website checker
“fakewebsitebuster.com” reports multiple red flags: fake company age (domain name),
copied text in the profile, exorbitant returns and referral fees, business relationships with
non-existent firms (Crypto Bit Business Ltd does not exist), a US address with a UK phone
number, spelling mistakes, etc [9]. Figure 3 shows two of the scheme’s on-ramp webpages.
As with pumping frauds, researchers are now focusing on detection tools. Bartoletti et al.
(2018) develop a data mining model based on probabilistic parameters and decision trees to
recognize Bitcoin Ponzi schemes and thus identify 1,211 addresses that collectively received
over US$10m. Unfortunately, identification does not equal protection - as proven by the fact
that many pyramid schemes are still active. Perhaps the only line of defense, as with other
frauds, is investor education. As the maxim goes: “If it looks too good to be true, then it’s not
real!”
While these six categories highlight the evolution of old schemes, there is an avalanche of
new scams that derive their origin in the advent of cryptocurrencies and the digital era.
They include fraudulent ICOs, rug pulls, cloud mining cons, exit scams, fake recovery
services and developers, sim swaps, tampered hardware, impersonation, and social media
giveaways, etc. While these are beyond the scope of this study, they will certainly occupy
researchers in the near future.

Figure 3.
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4. Conclusions and directions for future research
Digital assets and related technologies have seized the consciousness of the investing public
due to media attention, novelty, and the potential for speculation. Although these assets are
relatively new to investors, the standard fraud schemes still generate significant economic
rents, facilitating a process of innovation and evolution by criminals to incorporate digital
assets. For regulators and law enforcement to properly respond to the threat posed in the
digital asset sphere, they should comprehend how criminal activity differs in cyberspace,
the nature of fraud schemes currently being carried out, and why investors fall prey to
digital asset fraud schemes.
In this paper, we describe how cyberspace offers an expanded fraud opportunity set for
fraudsters through the Space Transition Theory. We detail six old schemes operationalized
historically in the physical space that have been recycled for applicability to digital assets:
ransomware, price manipulation, improper disclosures, pump and dumps, Ponzi schemes, and
spoof sites and fake apps. All have generated significant economic losses to investors thus far.
Regulators should enact a public awareness campaign regarding these fraud schemes so
that potential victims recognize the fraud before investing. However, it may not be possible to
overcome cognitive biases and a predilection for risk-taking behavior through education alone,
so financial crime professionals and regulators will need to remain vigilant. Regulators should
also exercise caution because negative externalities can occur when regulators attempt to
regulate away undesirable rent-seeking activities. Over- or ill-conceived regulation may
increase costs and ultimately reduce socially beneficial innovation related to digital asset
markets or distort incentives, facilitating innovation in new fraud schemes.
This paper provides avenues for future research linking psychological theories to
crypto-fraud schemes to better uncover the susceptibility of individuals to these fraud
schemes. Research regarding the psychology of digital asset investors, the propensity to
gamble using digital assets and fraud schemes that exploit gambling activity, and
potential links between behavioral biases and digital fraud schemes could provide
significant insights for anti-financial crime professionals. In addition, research regarding
aspects of regulatory activity with the potential to reduce the reaction time of financial
crime professionals to innovations in digital asset fraud. Further research can also
address new schemes with digital coins, including fraudulent ICOs, rug pulls, exit scams,
fake exchanges/developers/recovery, sim swaps, tampered cold wallets, and others, as
they emerge.
Notes

1. See Dupuis and Gleason (2020) for the many ways crypto transactions can be traced and/or obfuscated.
2. See www.anchain.ai/ciso for software details.

3. See one of the advertising videos at www.youtube.com/watch?v=-3wUe2N2_OY
4. See Butler et al (2021), available at www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/crypto-every-regulator-wants-apiece-of-2031508/

5. Source: https://tether.to
6. See Roberts (2021) for details.
7. For example, see https://cryptochainuni.com/scam-list/
8. The complete scam dataset is available at: https://cryptoexchangescam.github.io/ScamDataset/
9. See https://fakewebsitebuster.com/cryptobase-team/ for details.
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